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1 Introduction
Many public goods benefit a diffuse and large number of individuals, yet they require the individual con-
tributions of many. Examples include donating money and time to help sustain charities, participating
in civic duties such as schoolboard meetings and neighborhood associations, or being an informed citizen
and participating in elections and referenda. In this context, it has often been argued that the effective
provision of public goods requires a social fabric underlying it (Putnam 2000; Durlauf 2002). For example,
Putnam (2000) famously argued that the decline in civic activities in the US, that severed social ties between
individuals in communities, caused a sharp reduction in prosocial behavior.1
Laboratory experiments have demonstrated that individuals are more willing to contribute to public
goods if others do so as well (Falk and Fischbacher 2002; Fehr and Fischbacher 2004). Evidence from field
experiments shows that informing individuals about prosocial behavior of others increases the individuals’
propensity to contribute (Frey and Meier 2004; Shang and Croson 2009). These results are consistent
with various different mechanisms: On the one hand, the experimental manipulations could lead to more
prosocial behavior as they may be informative about the value of the good cause (Be´nabou and Tirole 2003),
or signal social norms (Be´nabou and Tirole 2011). On the other hand, the increase in prosocial behavior
could also reflect a genuine response to the other individuals’ motivation. Another plausible mechanism
is joint consumption. Engaging in a prosocial activity such as attending a school meeting, blood drive, or
turning out to vote may be more enjoyable – or less costly – in the company of others. This, again, creates
a motivational spillover: if it is more likely that others engage in a prosocial activity, an individual’s utility
from engaging in the activity as well increases. The latter two mechanisms stand out since they generate
a “social multiplier” that lies at the heart of social capital. If motivation spills over between individuals,
any intervention that affects individual motivation will feed back into the community and will have a larger
aggregate effect akin to the Keynesian consumption multiplier.
Previous research also suggests that motivational spillovers are particularly strong between individuals
connected with strong social ties (McAdam 1986). Several studies show that altruism is stronger between
individuals who are socially connected, even under laboratory anonymity (Twenge et al. 2007; Goette,
Huffman and Meier 2006; Leider et al. 2010). Social ties may also be particularly important in field settings.
Indeed correlational evidence on social networks suggests that motivation spillovers may occur along strong
social ties (O’Malley et al. 2012).
In this paper, we investigate whether social ties lead to motivational spillovers in the context of voluntary
blood donations. Voluntary blood donations are a textbook example of prosocial behavior that benefits a
large number of individuals. Donors receive no material compensation but bear the personal cost of giving
their blood. Nevertheless, they provide for the majority of blood products used for medical treatments in
the developed world (World Health Organization 2011; Slonim, Wang and Garbarino 2014). Studying moti-
vations to donate blood is instructive to understand a wide class of prosocial behaviors, such as volunteering,
voting or other civic activities, in which spillovers of motivation may occur.
1See Olken (2009) for an empirical test of this mechanism.
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We use data from individuals that are pre-registered for blood drives at the Blood Transfusion Service of
the Red Cross in Zurich, Switzerland (BTSRC). As social ties are fostered by closeness in space (Marmaros
and Sacerdote 2006; Goette, Huffman and Meier 2006) and age (Marsden 1988; McPherson, Smith-Lovin
and Cook 2001; Kalmijn and Vermunt 2007), we focus on the 7,446 pre-registered individuals in our sample
who live at a street address with exactly one fellow tenant who is also pre-registered in the same blood
drive, and who is within less than 20 years difference in age. Over the sample period from April 2011
to January 2013, these individuals are invited repeatedly to blood drives, creating 10,120 observations of
dyads, with each individual deciding whether or not to donate.2 In every dyad, each of the two individuals
received a personalized invitation letter for the upcoming blood drive and a text message on her mobile
phone reminding her of the event. In the context of Switzerland (and much of Europe), most people live
in apartment buildings, with only 15% living in single-family homes (Bundesamt fu¨r Statistik 2014). Thus,
focusing on individuals with the same street address is a natural starting point.
Identifying social interaction is difficult (Manski 2000; Durlauf 2002): simply observing a correlation in
behavior within dyads is not necessarily evidence of social interaction. Both individuals may be exposed
to a similar environment, thus experiencing correlated shocks to their propensity to donate that generate
an omitted-variable bias which exaggerates the causal effect of social interaction. Furthermore, it is hard
to distinguish endogenous from exogenous social interaction. With endogenous social interaction, the fellow
tenant’s propensity to donate is directly affected by the other individual’s propensity to donate, whereas
under exogenous social interaction, it is influenced by the other individual’s characteristics. The distinction
between these two types of social interaction is policy relevant. As endogenous social interaction effects go in
both directions and result in a feedback loop between the two individuals within a dyad, they create a social
multiplier that could greatly amplify the effectiveness of policy interventions. Exogenous social interaction
effects, on the other hand, go just in one direction and do not create any social multipliers. Finally, the
presence of endogenous social interaction itself creates an endogeneity problem between the two individuals
within a dyad. If the propensity to donate spills from one individual to her fellow tenant, that propensity
(partly) spills back, causing an endogeneity bias also known as the reflection problem (Manski 1993).
In order to cut through these potential biases, one needs an instrument that affects an individual’s
propensity to donate but leaves her other characteristics as well as her fellow tenant’s propensity to donate
unaffected. We use a phone call to a subset of the invited individuals two days before the blood drive, asking
them to donate because their blood types are in short supply at the moment. It satisfies the previous two
requirements for an instrument. First, because the phone call is randomized conditional on blood type, it
is exogenous to the recipient’s other characteristics and her propensity to donate. Second, the phone call
directly increases the recipient’s propensity to donate (Bruhin et al. 2015), but leaves the fellow tenant’s
propensity to donate unaffected, unless the individuals within the dyad interact. Note also, that since all
individuals already received a personalized invitation for the upcoming blood drive and a text message
2Blood drives are special events where individuals come and donate blood. In addition, there are also fixed donation centers
that collect about 50% of all whole blood transfusions. However, we exclude data from these fixed donation centers as they do not
conduct any randomized interventions.
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reminding them of the event, the only additional information conveyed by the phone call is the scarcity of
its recipient’s specific blood type.3
We apply a linear-in-motivation model adapted from Manski (1993) in a bivariate probit specification.
This allows us to distinguish endogenous from exogenous social interaction effects, without imposing restric-
tive assumptions on how contextual effects affect donations.
Overall, we find strong evidence for endogenous social interaction effects. The estimates of our baseline
specification imply that 44 percent of the change in an individual’s propensity to donate directly spills over
to her fellow tenant’s propensity to donate. Calling up the individual raises her propensity to donate by
roughly 12 percentage points (over a baseline of roughly 30 percentage points). The phone call also raises
her fellow tenant’s propensity to donate by 5 percentage points. The finding is robust, as depending on the
specification, 40 to 44 percent of the change in the individual’s propensity to donate is transmitted to her
fellow tenant.
An important question is whether there are also exogenous social interaction effects arising due to at-
tributes to which the fellow tenant reacts. Our setup and the bivariate probit model allow us to identify
such exogenous social interaction effects: our dataset contains various characteristics of the individuals that
strongly predict blood donations, such as age and the number of donations in the year prior to the beginning
of the intervention study. These characteristics, in combination with the time-varying instrument, allow us
to disentangle endogenous from exogenous social interaction effects. We find no evidence that individuals
respond to some exogenous characteristics of the fellow tenant that generally predict donations.
Having established strong endogenous social interaction effects, we are also able to better understand
the mechanisms driving them. In particular, is it motivation that is transmitted between fellow tenants or
perhaps information (about the current scarcity of a specific blood type in our case)? Previous studies that
found evidence of peer effects point to information rather than motivation transmission: Drago, Mengel and
Traxler (2013) show that reminders about one’s obligation to pay TV dues spread to neighbors who were not
targeted by the mailing, even when the recipient of the reminder was already previously complying. Duflo
and Saez (2003) show that information about pension plans spreads similarly among work colleagues. In the
context of blood donations, Lacetera, Macis and Slonim (2014) announce to a subset of blood donors that
they will be given a stored-value card if they donate blood. Interestingly, they find that the incentive effects
also percolate to other donors who were not made aware of the incentives, again pointing to information as
the driver of the peer effect. On the other hand, studies that examine the role of peer effects in work effort
find that it is the behavior, rather than information, that is transmitted. For instance, Mas and Moretti
(2009) exploit random assignment of clerks to check stands. They find strong spillovers of productivity.
They argue that the most likely explanation of their finding is peer pressure, since their results indicate that
only workers in sight of a coworker are affected by her productivity (see also Herbst and Mas 2015).
3We apply a strict intention-to-treat (ITT) methodology regarding the phone call: we only consider whether an individual was
on a call list, not whether the call was answered in person, whether a message was left on the answering machine, or whether the
call was even made. This ITT approach only affects the interpretation of the direct effect of the phone call, not the identification
of the endogenous social interaction.
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We are able to test whether information is transmitted in our setting in two ways. First, we examine
whether a phone call to an individual with a blood type that is incompatible with the fellow tenant’s
blood type also affects the fellow tenant’s propensity to donate. If it were only the information about the
temporary shortage of a specific blood type that was transmitted, the effect should be absent for individuals
with incompatible blood types, or at least significantly weaker.4 However, we find the same effect as for
individuals with compatible blood types. Second, we check whether a phone call to an individual is ineffective
if the fellow tenant also was called by the BTSRC. Again, in case the information mattered, we would expect
the effect to be weaker if both individuals of a dyad received a phone call, but we find no evidence thereof.
Thus, our evidence suggests that it is motivation, not information, that is transmitted between the individuals
in a dyad. It is, to our knowledge, the first study to document spillovers of prosocial motivation in the field.
With an estimated two thirds of our sample being cohabiting couples, it is also interesting to ask whether
spillovers are confined to them or whether they are present among all dyads in our sample.5 Because cohab-
itation is not directly observable, we apply a finite mixture model to detect heterogeneity in motivational
spillovers. The panel structure of our data and the modeling of the individuals’ donation decisions within a
bivariate probit model lends itself to an analysis with a finite mixture model. However, when we search in
the data for latent heterogeneity of this sort, we find no evidence of distinct types of dyads. Since a finite
mixture model with more than one type of dyads overfits the data, it seems that motivational spillovers, in
the case of blood donations, are equally present in cohabiting couples as well as among fellow tenants.
In sum, our study provides strong support for the notion that prosocial motivation can spill over be-
tween individuals with social ties. These motivational spillovers alter the cost-benefit calculations of policy
interventions in important ways: the estimates of our baseline specification indicate that 44 percent of the
initial impulse on motivation from the phone call spills over to the fellow tenant. In turn, 44 percent of that
increase in the fellow tenant’s motivation spills back to the individual being called, and so on. The resulting
feedback loop creates a social amplification effect of 1/(1− 0.442) for the individual being called, and raises
the fellow tenant’s motivation by a fraction 0.44/(1 − 0.442). Overall, the resulting social multiplier is the
sum of the two, and in our case, equals to 1/(1 − 0.44) = 1.79. Even in our strictest specification, we
find that 37 percent of the motivation spills over to the fellow tenant, yielding a lower-bound multiplier of
1/(1− 0.37) = 1.63. Thus, motivational spillovers raise the effectiveness of policy interventions by 60 to 80
percent. This social multiplier affects optimal policy, as a behavioral intervention has substantially higher
benefits when targeted towards dyads instead of isolated individuals.
We also explore the role of the nonlinearity in the bivariate probit model by re-estimating our model
by two-stage least squares (TSLS). Although the models differ slightly in their interpretation, we also find
significant spillover effects in the TSLS specification, and virtually the same implied social multiplier.
4If an individual has a blood type that is incompatible with the one in shortage, then donating her blood does not help to
reduce the shortage (for instance, someone with blood type B+ donating her blood when blood type A- is in shortage.). Therefore,
she should not react to the information of the phone call as strong as if she would have a compatible blood type.
5We do not observe cohabitation directly. However, our data indicate that 83% of the dyads are opposite-sex dyads. Denote
by x the fraction of cohabiting couples. Under random matching for non-cohabiting tenants, x is given by x+ (1− x) · 0.5 = 0.83,
which yields x = 0.66.
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This study directly contributes to the existing empirical literature on voluntary blood donation. Previous
studies have mainly focused on finding behavioral interventions that increase individual motivations and are
relatively cost effective. Several studies examine the impact of offering cash-like incentives such as gift cards
(Lacetera, Macis and Slonim 2012a; Ferrari et al. 1985; Niessen-Ruenzi, Weber and Becker 2014), or other
material incentives like t-shirts (Reich et al. 2006) or health tests (Goette et al. 2009). They find that, in
general, offering material incentives increases blood donations. Other interventions, such as a phone call
pointing out the scarcity of their blood type (Bruhin et al. 2015) or highlighting the emphatic motive in a
personal phone call to donors (Reich et al. 2006) are also highly effective.6
As mentioned previously, Lacetera, Macis and Slonim (2014) implemented randomized interventions,
informing half of the donors in an intervention blood drive that they would receive a cash-like reward if they
donated blood, while leaving the other half uninformed about this reward. At control drives, no one was
informed that they would receive a reward, even though they did. They find that donors who were directly
informed of the reward have a significantly higher propensity to donate blood than donors at control drives.
Interestingly, also the uninformed donors at intervention drives had a higher probability to donate blood of
roughly half the size of the informed donors’ treatment effect. Lacetera, Macis and Slonim (2014) provide
clear evidence of social influence among donors. Their results are consistent with the interpretation that
donors spread the information about the incentives to other potential donors they know, thus creating an
indirect treatment effect on the uninformed donors. By contrast, our setting focuses on the transmission of
donor motivation, independently of the social transmission of information about incentives. These results,
taken together, suggest a pervasive impact of social ties on blood donations, and raise the prospect that
informational and motivational spillovers are pervasive in other forms of prosocial behavior as well.
The present study also adds to the broader literature that distinguishes between endogenous and exoge-
nous social interaction and highlights the importance of social multipliers in various contexts. For example,
Cipollone and Rosolia (2007) find strong social interaction within high schools, where an increment in the
boys’ graduation rate leads to an increase in the girls’ graduation rate. Similarly, Lalive and Cattaneo
(2009) conclude that when a child stays longer in school, his friends stay longer too. Borjas and Dorani
(2014) discover strong knowledge spillovers in collaboration spaces when high-quality researchers directly
engage with other researchers in the joint production of new knowledge. Finally, Kessler (2013) shows in
an experimental study that subjects making non-binding announcements of their contributions to a public
good motivate other subjects to contribute as well.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the empirical set up. Section 3 presents the
econometric analysis. Section 4 discusses the results and some robustness checks. Finally, section 5 concludes.
6See Goette, Stutzer and Frey (2010) or Lacetera, Macis and Slonim (2013) for a more extensive review.
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2 The Empirical Setup
This section discusses the origin and structure of the panel data set, how we isolate dyads of fellow tenants
with potential social ties, and the phone call we use as instrument for identifying social interaction effects.
2.1 Origin and Structure of the Data
The panel data set contains information about all 40,617 individuals who are pre-registered in the BTSRC’s
data base as they made at least one donation prior to the onset of the study. During the study period from
April 2011 to January 2013, the BTSRC repeatedly invited these individuals to upcoming blood drives.
These are regular events, typically taking place twice a year, at which donations can be made.7 The blood
drives are coordinated by local organizations, such as church chapters or sports clubs, but organized centrally
by the BTSRC which administers the invitation of individuals and provides the equipment and personnel
to take blood. The invitation procedure works as follows: For each upcoming blood drive, the BTSRC
sends a personalized invitation letter to all eligible individuals pre-registered in its data base, i.e. individuals
who did not donate within the past three months and meet all donation criteria. All invited individuals
additionally receive a text message on their mobile phones reminding them about the time and location of
the blood drive. These invitations constitute the observations in the panel data set, as each of them requires
the individuals to decide whether to donate or not. On average, each of the 40,617 pre-registered individuals
received 3.09 invitations, resulting in 125,692 observations.
For each observation, the data set contains the following information: a binary indicator whether the
individual donated at the blood drive she was invited to, her street (in a codified form), house number, and
zip code, as well as her age, gender, blood type, and the number of donations she made in the year prior to
the beginning of the study. Moreover, we also observe whether the individual additionally received a phone
call, informing her that her blood type is currently in short supply.
2.2 Dyads of Fellow Tenants
To test for social interaction effects, we aim to focus on individuals with strong social ties. However,
in our data set, we only observe a limited set of individual characteristics due to the physician patient
privilege. Thus, we first draw on earlier evidence that shows that proximity is an important predictor of
social ties. Marmaros and Sacerdote (2006) report that random allocations to university dorms strongly
predict subsequent friendships. Similarly, Goette, Huffman and Meier (2006) find that random allocations
to platoons in a training unit in the Swiss Army immediately lead to strong social ties between individuals.
Second, we use evidence that friends are often very close in age: several studies document that friendship
pairs typically have very small age differences, with roughly 90 percent of the friendship pairs having an
age difference of less than 20 years (Marsden 1988; McPherson, Smith-Lovin and Cook 2001; Kalmijn and
Vermunt 2007).
7The BTSRC also operates fixed donation centers which we do not consider as the invitations procedure is different.
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics for dyads (intra-dyad age difference < 20 years)
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Corr. in dyad
Donation 0.322 0.467 0.368
Age 43.186 11.850 0.859
Male 0.511 0.500 mixed-gender dyads: 83%
# of observations 10, 120
# of dyads 3, 723
In this spirit, we first define groups of fellow tenants, invited to the same blood drive, by exploiting
the available information on the individuals’ place of residence. Note, however, the codified address only
allows us to determine whether the individuals live in the same building with a given house number, but
not whether they are actually friends or partners living in the same household or just neighbors living in the
same apartment building.
We restrict our attention to dyads of fellow tenants, i.e. pairs, for the following two reasons. First,
eliminating large groups of fellow tenants, increases the probability that two individuals interact with each
other. With a third individual present, it is more likely that the individuals are neither friends with each
other nor partners. Second, by focussing on dyads, we can apply a bivariate probit model that is frequently
used for estimating the effect of an endogenous binary regressor on a binary outcome variable (Abadie 2000;
Angrist 2001; Winkelmann 2012). Applying this first restriction yields 5,053 distinct dyads with 13,421
observations at the dyad-level, or 2× 13, 421 = 26, 842 observations at the individual-level.
Subsequently, as motivated by the studies cited above, we limit the age difference between the two fellow
tenants within each dyad to less than 20 years. This reduces our sample further to 3, 723 dyads with 10, 120
observations at the dyad level.
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics of the sample of dyads we use for the estimation. The average
age of our individuals is 43 years, and 51 percent of them are male. It is noteworthy that roughly 83
percent of the dyads are mixed-gender, far more than one would expect under random sampling. This allows
us to get a sense of what fraction of fellow tenants are cohabiting (heterosexual8) couples, assuming that
for non-cohabiting tenants, the gender composition is random. Simple calculations show that the fraction
of cohabiting couples is roughly 66 percent.9 Thus, our sample consists of about two thirds cohabiting
couples and one third non-cohabiting tenants. This raises the question whether, due to stronger social ties,
motivational spillovers might be more pronounced among cohabiting couples than among non-cohabiting
tenants. In section 3.3, we will address this question explicitly by formally examining heterogeneity in our
sample.
8The BTSRC did not allow blood donations from homosexual individuals over the sample period we cover, thus ruling out
same-sex couples.
9Denote by x the fraction of cohabiting couples. Under random matching for non-cohabiting tenants, x is given by x+ (1−x) ·
0.5 = 0.83, which yields x = 0.66.
7
0
.
2
.
4
.
6
D
on
at
io
n 
ra
te
 o
f t
he
 fo
ca
l in
di
vid
ua
l
Fellow tenant
does not donate
Fellow tenant
donates
Figure 1: Donation rate of a focal individual conditional
on whether the fellow tenant donates (with 95% CI)
Table 2: Distribution of donations within dyads
Both donate One donates Nobody donates
Dyad (1,1) (1,0) & (0,1) (0,0)
Empirical distribution: 18.40% 27.60% 54.00%
Distribution under independence: 10.37% 43.66% 45.97%
χ2-test for independent donations within dyads: p < 0.001
Figure 1 shows the correlation between the individuals’ donation decisions. Given that their fellow tenant
donates blood, almost 60 percent of the individuals also donate themselves. If their fellow tenant does not
donate, only 20 percent of the individuals donate. Table 2 illustrates this point from a different angle, by
looking at the joint distribution of donations within dyads. It shows that 18.4% of all dyad-observations
exhibit two donations upon both being invited, 27.6% show one donation, and 54% have no donations. Note
that there are significantly more dyad-observations with either both individuals or no individual donating
blood than expected under independence (χ2-test for independent donations within dyads, p-value ≤ 0.001).
Thus, donations within dyads are positively correlated.
However, as we pointed out in the introduction, the correlation in figure 1 and table 2 is not sufficient to
show that social interaction between the individuals in a dyad exists. We are going to analyze this correlation
in greater detail to determine the extent to which it is due to different types of social interaction.
2.3 Instrument for Identifying the Social Interaction Effects
The BTSRC uses phone calls to invited individuals to increase turnout for blood types that are in particularly
short supply. It applies the following procedure. Depending on the daily inventory in its blood stock, which
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is subject to random fluctuations in supply and demand, the BTSRC determines which of the blood types,
A-, A+, O-, or O+, are in short supply, and uses a software tool to put a random subset of invited individuals
with matching blood types on a call list two days ahead of the blood drive.10 As reported in Table 3, 8.9%
of the individual observations in our sample received a phone call. In 1.40% of the dyad-observations both
individuals received a phone call, in 14.99% of the dyad-observations only one individual was called, and in
83.61% of the dyad-observations no one received a phone call.
Since negative blood types are more versatile than positive ones, the BTSRC tends to call individuals
with negative blood types more often. This could lead to the following issue: if individuals choose their fellow
tenants conditionally on their blood types, and in particular, if individuals with negative blood types are more
likely to live together, dyads in which both individuals exhibit negative blood types will be called more often
and thus donate more often.11 This would confound our estimate of endogenous social interaction effects.
In order to rule out this potential issue, we compare the expected frequency of dyads with two negative
blood types under independence with their observed frequency. Table 4 reveals that in our sample, 16.64%
of individuals have negative blood types. Thus, the the expected frequency of dyads with two negative blood
types under independence is 2.77%. This is not significantly different from the observed frequency of 2.98%
(t-test, p-value=0.45). Consequently, we can rule out this potential issue.
Table 3: Descriptive statistics of the phone call
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Corr. in dyad
Phone call 0.089 0.285 0.075
Share of dyad-observations without phone call 83.61%
Share of dyad-observations with 1 phone call 14.99%
Share of dyad-observations with 2 phone calls 1.40%
# of observations 10, 120
Each phone call provides the same information about the upcoming blood drive, stating explicitly: “Your
blood type X is in short supply, please come and donate at the upcoming blood drive.” Note that since all
individuals already received a personalized invitation letter plus a text message to remind them about the
upcoming blood drive, the only additional information the phone call conveys is about the current scarcity of
the recipient’s specific blood type. Nevertheless, the phone call is highly effective, raising donation rates by
roughly 8 percentage points from a baseline of 30 percentage points (Bruhin et al. 2015). In sum, the phone
call is triggered by random fluctuations in supply and demand, making it virtually as good as a random
intervention, and it directly affects the recipient’s propensity to donate.
In order to be a valid instrument, we also need to assert that a phone call itself does not affect the
fellow tenant’s propensity to donate directly, i.e. that it satisfies the exclusion restriction. In part, this
10The BTSRC confines the phone calls to blood types A-, A+, O-, or O+, as they are often in short supply.
11On grounds of a popular wisdom from East Asia, the correlation between personality and blood types have been extensively
researched in psychology. However, there is no supporting evidence for such a correlation in the recent literature (see Wildman
and Hollingsworth (2009), Cramer and Imaike (2002), Rogers and Glendon (2003), and Wu, Lindsted and Lee (2005)).
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Table 4: Distribution of blood types
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Corr. in dyad
Share of negative blood types 16.64%
Expected frequency of dyads with two individuals
with negative blood types, under independence 2.77%
Observed frequency of dyads with two individuals
with negative blood types 2.98%
T-test: observed frequency of
all-negative dyads=2.77% p=0.45
# of dyads 3, 723
is guaranteed by the institutional setup. The BTSRC reaches the individuals during office hours on their
mobile phones. Thus, the phone call does not directly affect the propensity to donate of the fellow tenant
who is most likely not present at that time. Moreover, we present two tests in subsection 4.2 that address
this issue more explicitly.
Next, we check that the phone call is indeed randomized conditional on blood types. This conditional
randomization is crucial for the phone call being a valid instrument that is exogenous to all other individual
characteristics that may drive donations or cause the individuals to live together in the same household.
Table 5 verifies that, conditional on blood types, the phone calls are barely correlated with other individual
characteristics. The correlation of the phone calls with gender is not significant. Their correlation with age
is statistically significant but very small in magnitude. For example, the probability of receiving a phone
call decreases by only 0.1 percentage points for every additional 10 years of age. The phone calls also show
no clear correlation pattern with the donation history in the year prior to the onset of the study. In fact, the
corresponding coefficients are jointly significant in specification (1), without fixed effects, and specification
(2), with fixed effects for the location of the blood drives (174 location fixed effects). But they are jointly
insignificant in specification (3), with both location and 20 month fixed effects (F-tests for joint significance
(1) p-value: 0.001, (2) p-value: 0.002, (3) p-value: 0.225). Note that the correlations in specification (1)
and (2) between the phone calls and the donation history result by construction, because new individuals
entered the data set while the study was ongoing. These new individuals’ donation history was necessarily
zero at the time they received their first invitation. Because the month fixed effects pick up the resulting
correlations, they are jointly insignificant in specification (3).
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Table 5: Randomization checks for phone calls
Binary dependent variable: Received a phone call
OLS Regression (1) (2) (3)
Male -0.002 -0.002 -0.002
(0.01) (0.001) (0.001)
Age -0.0001** -0.0001** -0.0001**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
# of donations in year before study†
1 -0.004*** -0.005*** -0.002*
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
2 -0.004** -0.005*** -0.003**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
3 0.001 -0.003 -0.002
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
4 0.003 0.004 0.008
(0.014) (0.013) (0.013)
5 -0.011*** 0.008 0.009
(0.003) (0.012) (0.010)
Blood types
O- 0.724*** 0.723*** 0.725***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
A+ -0.012*** -0.013*** -0.013***
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
A- 0.252*** 0.252*** 0.251***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Constant 0.020*** -0.038*** 0.100*
(0.002) (0.002) (0.004)
† F-test for joint significance of 0.001 0.002 0.22
donation history dummies (p-value)
174 Location FEs? no yes yes
20 Month FEs? no no yes
# of observations 125,692 125,692 125,692
R-squared 0.541 0.558 0.568
Individual cluster robust standard errors in parentheses.
Levels of significance: ∗p < 0.1, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01
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2.4 Reduced-Form Evidence
In this subsection, we provide some first reduced-form evidence for the determinants of blood donations
within dyads. This first reduced-form evidence highlights the key feature in our data that will later drive
identification in the econometric model. However, in contrast to the econometric model, it neglects control
variables and the standard errors do not take into account that each dyad is observed multiple times. Hence,
it is for illustration only.
Figure 2 shows the reduced-form relationship between the phone call and donation rates. It provides a
first glimpse at the qualitative order of magnitude of the potential social interaction effects. Panel a) shows
the average change in the individuals’ donation frequency if they receive a phone call: the donation frequency
is 31 percent for individuals who do not receive a phone call, and increases by 13 percentage points if they
are called. Panel b) shows the average change in the individuals’ donation frequency if their fellow tenant
receives a phone call: it increases by roughly 5 percentage points, with the confidence intervals sufficiently
far apart to suggest a significant relationship.
As a simple illustrative tool to identify the impact of endogenous social interaction effects, we compare
the magnitude of the effect of the fellow tenants’ phone call on the individuals’ behavior relative to that
of the individuals’ own phone call on their behavior, in the spirit of the Wald estimator. Since the fellow
tenants’ phone call does not have a direct impact on the individuals, we can use the relative magnitude
of the two effects to identify social interaction effects among the individuals of the dyad: the estimates
suggest a spillover of roughly 5%/13% = 0.38, depicted in the rightmost panel of figure 2. This amounts to
a strong impact among the individuals of the dyad on each others’ decision to donate blood: given that an
individual’s fellow tenant donates, this raises her own probability of making a donation on average by 38
percentage points. Intriguingly, this is also close to the estimate from the “dirty” analysis that compares the
individuals’ donation rate as a function of whether their fellow tenants donated or not in Figure 1, suggesting
only modest influences from common shocks that simultaneously drive the behavior of both individuals of
the dyad.
The previous analysis shows evidence for endogenous social interaction effects, i.e. that a fellow tenant’s
decision to donate influences the other individual in a dyad. It is also interesting to ask whether there is
evidence of exogenous social interaction, i.e. whether the fellow tenant’s characteristics predict the other
individual’s donation. Figure 3 displays the individuals’ current donation rate as a function of their own past
donations (panel a) and their fellow tenants’ past donations (panel b). Panel a) reveals that the individuals
past donations strongly predict their current donations. Individuals who donated in the year before the
study are almost 20 percentage points more likely to donate now than individuals who did not donate in
the year before the study. However, panel b) shows that there appears to be no such relationship for the
fellow tenants’ donation histories: living with a fellow tenant who had donated regularly in the past does
not increase an individual’s propensity to donate. Overall, this first reduced-form evidence suggests that
social interaction within dyads occurs through endogenous effects, and there is little evidence of exogenous
effects.
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a) Donation rate as a function
of the focal individual being called
b) Donation rate as a function
of the fellow tenant being called
c) Wald estimator
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Figure 2: Donation frequency as function of the own phone call (panel a) and the fellow tenant’s phone call
(panel b). Including 95% confidence intervals and the Wald estimator.
a) Donation rate of individual
as a function of donating in
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Figure 3: Donation frequency as function of the own past donations (panel a) and the fellow tenant’s past
donations (panel b). Including 95% confidence intervals.
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3 Econometric Analysis
This section presents the econometric analysis for identifying endogenous and exogenous social interaction
effects. It first introduces the structural model and formally discusses the identification strategy. Subse-
quently, it briefly outlines the estimation procedure and our approach for dealing with potential behavioral
heterogeneity.
3.1 Structural Model
In the structural model, the immediate propensity of individual i in dyad d to donate blood is
Y ∗id = β0 + δY
∗
−id + β
′
1Xid + β
′
2X−id + id . (3.1)
For notational convenience we drop the subscript t for the invitation to an upcoming blood drive at time t in
this subsection. β0 is a constant, measuring the baseline propensity to donate. Y
∗
−id indicates the propensity
to donate of i’s fellow tenant. Thus, the parameter δ captures the effect of endogenous social interaction,
i.e. the extent to which the propensity to donate spills over within dyads. Xid represents individual i’s
characteristics, including gender, age, blood type, and dummies for the number of donations in the year
before the study began. X−id are the same characteristics of i’s fellow tenant. Hence, the parameter vector
β2 measures the effects of exogenous social interaction.
Since the decision whether or not to donate, Yid, is binary and we study dyads of fellow tenants, we can
estimate a bivariate probit model to capture the simultaneous decision-making of the two fellow tenants in
each dyad.
Y ∗1d = β0 + δY
∗
2d + β
′
1X1d + β
′
2X2d + 1d (3.2)
Y ∗2d = β0 + δY
∗
1d + β
′
1X2d + β
′
2X1d + 2d (3.3)
Y1d = 1 if Y
∗
1d > 0, and Y1d = 0 otherwise
Y2d = 1 if Y
∗
2d > 0, and Y2d = 0 otherwise
We assume the random errors 1d and 2d to be bivariate normally distributed, with E(1d) = E(2d) = 0,
Var(1d) = Var(2d) = 1, and Cor(1d, 2d) = ρ. The correlation between the random errors, ρ, captures
both potentially omitted exogenous effects such as health status and education as well as correlated effects
such as sharing a common environment.
Substituting equation 3.3 into 3.2 yields the reduced form,
Y ∗1d =
β0 + δβ0
1− δ2 +
β′1 + δβ
′
2
1− δ2 X1d +
δβ′1 + β
′
2
1− δ2 X2d +
δ2d + 1d
1− δ2 . (3.4)
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and the analogous expression for the fellow tenant:
Y ∗2d =
β0 + δβ0
1− δ2 +
β′1 + δβ
′
2
1− δ2 X2d +
δβ′1 + β
′
2
1− δ2 X1d +
δ1d + 2d
1− δ2 . (3.5)
The equations highlight the identification problem: we have three independent variables (the constant,
X1d, and X2d), but four unknown parameters (β0, β1, β2, and δ). If we assumed that ρ = 0, then the
functional form induced by the normality assumption over the errors in the structural form, 1d and 2d,
would allow us to identify δ. To see why this is true, note that the error terms in the reduced form, (3.4)
and (3.5), are linear combinations of the errors 1d and 2d in the structural form. Thus, when ρ = 0, we
could identify δ off the correlation of the error terms in the reduced form. However, when ρ 6= 0, this in itself
introduces a correlation in the errors in the structural form, leaving δ unidentified. In our context, ρ could
reflect omitted exogenous effects or unobservable common shocks to the propensity to donate stemming from
similar environments, thus making identification suspect if one imposed ρ = 0.
This identification problem can be resolved by introducing the phone call discussed in section 2.3. Within
our model, it takes on the role akin to an instrument in a TSLS estimation. Denote by Pid the binary variable
indicating whether individual i in dyad d received a phone call for the current invitation. As we argued
above, a critical feature of the phone call is that it directly affects individual i’s propensity to donate, but
not that of the fellow tenant. The econometric model then becomes
Y ∗1d = β0 + γP1d + δY
∗
2d + β
′
2X1d + β
′
2X2d + 1d (3.6)
Y ∗2d = β0 + γP2d + δY
∗
1d + β
′
1X2d + β
′
2X1d + 2d (3.7)
Substituting equation 3.7 into 3.6 yields the following reduced form:
Y ∗1d =
β0 + δβ0
1− δ2 +
γ
1− δ2P1d + δ
γ
1− δ2P2d +
β′1 + δβ
′
2
1− δ2 X1d +
δβ′1 + β
′
2
1− δ2 X2d +
δ2d + 1d
1− δ2 (3.8)
Note that the impact of the phone call P1d on individual 1’s propensity to donate is given by
γ
1−δ2 because
of the spillovers that go back and forth between the two fellow tenants: A fraction δ of the initial impulse
to individual 1 also affects individual 2, which in turn feeds back into individual 1’s propensity to donate,
and so on. This amplifies the response to the phone call if 0 < δ < 1. For individual 2, the overall effect
amounts to δ γ1−δ2 , as only a fraction δ of individual 1’s propensity to donate spills over to individual 2 (and
because individual 1’s phone call has no direct effect on individual 2’s propensity to donate – this is the
exclusion restriction needed to identify the spillovers). This allows us to identify the parameter δ by dividing
the reduced-form coefficient of individual 2’s phone call by the reduced-form coefficient of individual 1’s
phone call.12 Having obtained δ, we can identify all remaining structural parameters: as is obvious from the
12Notice also that the fact that γ has an intention-to-treat interpretation is irrelevant for the purposes of identifying the structural
parameter δ.
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reduced form above, all other structural parameters are uniquely identified once δ is recovered (see section
A.2 in the appendix on how to recover the structural parameters and calculate their standard errors).
A broad class of behavioral models give rise to the basic structure that we exploit in the econometric
model to identify the key parameter of interest, δ. To illustrate, consider the following simultaneous-move
game with imperfect information between two players: Each player has a benefit B from donating blood.
Each player also draws a cost ci from a uniform distribution on [0, C] that only she observes, but not the
other player. There is a consumption externality as the players each have an additional utility b if they
donate together. That additional utility could have many possible sources. For instance, it could reflect
image motivation from signaling the other player how motivated a player is. It could also reflect an additional
benefit from spending time at the blood drive together, or simply a reduction in transportation costs.
In this model, increasing the motivation of one player leads to exactly the type of spillover effects that our
structural model implies. Raising the benefit from donating to player 1 also raises the probability to donate
of player 2, which in turn raises the probability to donate of player 1, and so on. Notice that both players
have to know the other player’s benefit from donating, but not the cost. One could for example imagine
that the two players meet and tell each other about the phone calls, which informs them of the benefits.
However, there needs to be some residual uncertainty about whether the other player donates, which we
model through the cost of donating ci that is realized later and is private information. The players then have
to decide whether or not to donate without knowing the realization of the other player’s cost. It turns out
that in this particular example, a parameter δ ≡ b/C emerges in equilibrium that is related to the model’s
primitives, but acts as if the propensity to donate were spilled over as we postulate in the econometric model.
That parameter in the behavioral model is identified precisely the same way as in the econometric model,
by comparing the impact of the own phone call relative to the impact of the fellow tenants phone call on
behavior (see appendix A.1 for a detailed derivation). While this game most closely reflects the structure
of our model, one can also obtain the same result from another version of the simultaneous-move game in
which the players know each others’ cost realizations (see again appendix A.1 for details).
3.2 Estimation
We estimate the parameters of the bivariate probit model, θ = (β0, β
′
1, β
′
2, γ, δ, ρ)
′, using the method of
maximum likelihood. Dyad d’s contribution to the model’s density is
f(θ;Pd, Xd, Yd) =
Td∏
t=1
Φ2 (w1dt, w2dt, ρ
∗
dt) , (3.9)
where widt = qidtY
∗
idt, qidt = 2Yidt − 1, ρ∗ht = q1dtq2dtρdt, and Φ2 is the cumulative distribution function of
the bivariate normal distribution (Greene 2003). Equation 3.9 directly yields the model’s log likelihood,
lnL(θ;Pd, Xd, Yd) =
D∑
d=1
ln f(θ;Pd, Xd, Yd) . (3.10)
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As the Td observations of dyad d may be serially correlated, we estimate dyad cluster-robust standard errors
using the sandwich estimator (Huber 1967; Wooldridge 2002). To control for potential heterogeneity across
the locations and months of the blood drives, we include location and month fixed effects.
3.3 Testing for Behavioral Heterogeneity
To explore whether there is behavioral heterogeneity in the sense that there may exist distinct types of dyads
that differ in the extent and type of social interaction, we estimate a finite mixture model13. As pointed out
before, an estimated 66 percent of our individuals are cohabiting couples, and it is possible that social ties
with regard to blood donations are stronger within cohabiting couples than among non-cohabiting tenants.
Moreover, prosocial behavior is known to be heterogeneous (e.g. Fischbacher, Ga¨chter and Fehr (2001)), as
there may exist several distinct social preference types (Breitmoser 2013; Iriberri and Rey-Biel 2013; Bruhin,
Fehr and Schunk 2016; Bruhin et al. 2015). Thus, extending the pooled bivariate probit model to account
for behavioral heterogeneity could yield important additional insights.
The finite mixture model relaxes the assumption that there exists just one representative dyad in the
population. Instead, it allows the population to be made up by K distinct types of dyads differing in the
extent of social interaction. The parameter vector θk is no longer representative for all dyads but rather
depends on the type of the dyads as indicated by the subscript k. Thus, dyad d’s contribution to the
likelihood of the finite mixture model,
`(θk;Pd, Xd, Yd) =
K∑
k=1
pik f(θk;Pd, Xd, Yd) , (3.11)
equals the sum over all K type-specific densities, f(θk;Pd, Xd, Yd), weighted by the relative sizes of the
corresponding types pik. Since the finite mixture model makes no assumptions about how type-membership
is related to observable characteristics, we do not know a priori to which type dyad d belongs. Hence,
the types’ relative sizes, pik, may be interpreted as ex-ante probabilities of type-membership, and the log
likelihood of the finite mixture model is given by
lnL(Ψ;P,X, Y ) =
D∑
d=1
ln
K∑
k=1
pik f(θk;Pd, Xd, Yd) , (3.12)
where the vector Ψ = (pi1, . . . , piK−1, θ′1, . . . , θ
′
K)
′ contains all parameters of the model.
Once we obtained the parameter estimates of the finite mixture model, Ψˆ, we can classify each dyad
into the type it most likely belongs to. In particular, we apply Bayes’ rule to calculate the dyad’s ex-post
probabilities of type-membership given the parameter estimates of the finite mixture model,
τdk =
pˆikf(θˆk;Pd, Xd, Yd)∑K
m=1 pˆimf(θˆk;Pd, Xd, Yd)
. (3.13)
13Finite mixture models have become increasingly popular to uncover latent heterogeneity in various fields of behavioral eco-
nomics. For recent examples see Houser, Keane and McCabe (2004); Harrison and Rutstro¨m (2009); Bruhin, Fehr-Duda and Epper
(2010); Conte, Hey and Moffat (2011); Breitmoser (2013); Bruhin et al. (2015).
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Note that the true number of distinct types in the population is unknown. Thus, a crucial part of
estimating a finite mixture model is to determine the optimal number of distinct types, K∗, the model
accounts for. On the one hand, if K is too small, the model is not flexible enough to capture all the essential
behavioral heterogeneity in the data. On the other hand, if K is too large, the finite mixture model overfits
the data and captures random noise, resulting in an ambiguous classification of dyads into overlapping types.
However, determining K∗ is difficult for the following two reasons:
1. Due to the nonlinear form of the log likelihood (equation 3.12), there exist no standard tests for K∗
that exhibit a test statistic with a known distribution (McLachlan and Peel 2000). 14
2. Standard model selection criteria, such as the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) or the Bayesian
Information Criterion (BIC), are not applicable either as they tend to favor models with too many
types (Atkinson 1981; Geweke and Meese 1981; Celeux and Soromenho 1996; Biernacki, Celeux and
Govaert 2000b).
To determine the optimal number of distinct types, K∗, we approximate the Normalized Integrate Com-
plete Likelihood (Biernacki, Celeux and Govaert 2000a) by applying the ICL-BIC criterion (McLachlan
and Peel 2000),
ICL-BIC(K) = BIC(K)−2
D∑
d=1
K∑
k=1
τdk ln τdk.
The ICL-BIC is based on the BIC, but additionally features an entropy term that acts as a penalty for an
ambiguous classification of dyads into types. If the classification is clean, the K types are well segregated
and almost all dyads exhibit ex-post probabilities of type-membership, τdk, that are all either close to 0 or
1. In that case, the entropy term is almost 0 and the ICL-BIC nearly coincides with the BIC. However,
if the classification is ambiguous, some of the K types overlap and many dyads exhibit ex-post probabilities
of type-membership in the vicinity of 1/K. In that case, the absolute value of the entropy term is large,
indicating that the finite mixture model overfits the data and tries to identify types that do not exist. Thus,
to determine the optimal number of types, we need to minimize the ICL-BIC with respect to K.
14Lo, Mendell and Rubin (2001) proposed a statistical test (LMR-test) to select among finite mixture models with varying
numbers of types, which is based on Vuong (1989)’s test for non-nested models. However, the LMR-test is unlikely to be suitable
when the alternative model is a single-type model with strongly non-normal outcomes Muthe´n (2003).
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4 Results
This section presents the results of the econometric analysis. First, it discusses the estimated coefficients
of the bivariate probit model in our baseline specification allowing us to distinguish between endogenous
and exogenous social interaction. We then examine whether endogenous social interaction is driven by
the transmission of motivation or information. Subsequently, we assess whether there is any evidence of
behavioral heterogeneity with regard to social interaction. We also perform two robustness checks to evaluate
the role of the functional-form assumptions implicit in the bivariate probit, as well as the role of the restriction
in age difference that we impose on the sample.
4.1 Estimated coefficients of the Bivariate Probit Model
Table 6 shows the estimated coefficients for the structural equation in three different specifications of the
bivariate probit model. Column (1) shows the estimates of the specification without fixed effects. Column
(2) shows the estimates of the specification with location fixed effects, while the specification in column (3)
additionally controls for month fixed effects. We add fixed effects to avoid confounds that may arise since
the blood drives took place at different locations and points in time, which may affect both individuals in
a dyad similarly. The 174 location fixed effects absorb differences between urban and rural areas as well as
among the local organizers of the blood drives. The 20 month fixed effects pick up seasonal fluctuations or
special events that influence donation rates, such as school holidays.
First, we examine the direct effect of the phone call on the probability to donate. The coefficient γ is
positive, and estimated with considerable precision, with a z-statistic of well over 3. Its absolute magnitude
is not directly interpretable, as it reflects the impact of the phone call on the individual’s (latent) propensity
to donate, Y ∗, and not directly on her probability to donate. In order to express the effect on the probability
to donate, we have to calculate its marginal probability effect as defined in equation (A.6) in appendix A.3.
These calculations reveal that the probability to donate increases by 9 percentage points for individuals who
were on the call list, a sizable increase over the baseline donation rate of 32 percent. This estimate is virtually
identical to the effect found in Bruhin et al. (2015), who estimate the impact of the phone call on turnout in
the entire population of blood donors, most of whom do not have a fellow tenant pre-registered in the same
blood drive. Thus, focusing on dyads does not induce selectivity in terms of how strongly individuals react
to the phone call.
Next, we examine the extent of the endogenous social interaction effect within dyads. The corresponding
parameter δ is significant in all three specifications. It is equal to 0.44 in the baseline specification of column
(1). This implies that of a one-unit increase in the fellow tenant’s propensity to donate roughly 44 percent
spills over to the other individual in the dyad. Hence, an individual’s propensity to donate blood strongly
depends on her fellow tenant’s propensity to donate. The estimates are slightly lower in columns (2) and (3)
where we also include the location and month fixed effects. But even in the strictest specification of column
(3), the parameter is equal to 0.39, implying that 39 percent of a fellow tenant’s propensity to donate spill
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over to the other individual of the dyad.
Individual characteristics are strong determinants of blood donations. Men are significantly more likely
to donate blood than women. This gender effect is robust and quantitatively important. The marginal effect
of being male on the probability to donate is 4 percentage points, again an effect that is roughly similar to
the difference found in Bruhin et al. (2015). Donation rates also increase significantly with age. Increasing
age by one year increases the probability to donate by 0.5 percentage points. This finding is robust across all
three specifications and consistent with the result in many other studies (Wildman and Hollingsworth 2009;
Lacetera, Macis and Slonim 2012a, 2014). As in Wildman and Hollingsworth (2009) we find that donations
in the year before entering the study predict current blood donations: the coefficients for the number of
donations made prior to the beginning of the study reveal that regular donors are more likely to donate
than irregular donors. Finally, blood types have no significant effect on donation rates (Wald-test for joint
significance of all blood types, p > 0.4 in all specifications). In particular, individuals with highly demanded,
negative blood types do not donate more frequently (Wald-test for joint significance of negative blood types,
p > 0.6 in all specifications).
We now turn to the results regarding the effect of exogenous social interaction. A particularly interesting
question in that context is whether it is just the fellow tenant’s behavior per se, i.e. her immediate propensity
to donate, an individual respond to, or whether it is also some other characteristics that are acquired with
the behavior more generally. For instance, in studies documenting peer effects in schooling (Lalive and
Cattaneo 2009; Cipollone and Rosolia 2007), it is probably not just the behavior per se (going to school),
but also some characteristics acquired by it (getting a better education and a leg up in the labor market)
that is driving the peer effects.
The fact that we have individual characteristics that strongly predict donations in general, in combination
with a time-varying instrument, the phone call, allows us to address this issue. As mentioned above, an
individual’s age, gender and previous donations strongly predict her propensity to donate. Consequently, if
the fellow tenant reacts to these characteristics and not just the actual behavior, we should in turn find that
the fellow tenant’s age, gender and previous donation history also affect the individual’s propensity to donate.
However, table 6 shows that this is not the case, as the fellow tenant’s characteristics have, if anything, only
weak effects on the individual’s propensity to donate and most of them are not individually significant. A
joint F-test also reveals considerable fragility: adding location and month fixed effects knocks the F-statistics
below the conventional levels of significance. Therefore, there is little evidence that individuals also react to
the fellow tenant’s exogenous characteristics, besides her immediate propensity to donate.
Finally, the estimates of ρ (the correlation of the errors in the structural model) lie between−0.2 and−0.3,
depending on the specification, and are estimated with very little precision: in each of the specifications, the
standard error is roughly 0.4. These imprecise estimates leave a rather large confidence band, highlighting
again the advantage of not relying on assumptions about ρ to identify our parameter of interest δ.
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Table 6: Bivariate probit model
Binary dependent variable: donation decision (0,1)
Bivariate probit regression (1) (2) (3)
Phone call (γ) 0.236*** 0.241*** 0.233***
(0.063) (0.066) (0.061)
Endogenous social interaction (δ) 0.440*** 0.443*** 0.386**
(0.165) (0.169) (0.183)
Constant (β0) -0.562*** -0.642*** -0.643***
(0.168) (0.213) (0.238)
Focal individual’s characteristics (β1)
Male 0.111*** 0.100*** 0.104***
(0.024) (0.024) (0.025)
Age 0.012*** 0.013*** 0.013***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
# of donations in year before study
1 0.498*** 0.518*** 0.527***
(0.030) (0.031) (0.031)
2 0.843*** 0.897*** 0.908***
(0.037) (0.039) (0.039)
3 1.012*** 1.102*** 1.118***
(0.065) (0.072) (0.073)
4 1.000*** 1.137*** 1.118***
(0.146) (0.149) (0.179)
Blood types
O- 0.037 0.033 0.042
(0.058) (0.061) (0.059)
A+ -0.028 -0.023 -0.024
(0.023) (0.024) 0.024)
A- -0.012 0.009 0.008
(0.048) (0.047) (0.047)
Fellow tenant’s characteristics (β2)
Male -0.006 -0.018 -0.010
(0.031) (0.030) (0.032)
Age -0.006** -0.006** -0.006*
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
21
# donations in year before study
1 -0.228*** -0.237*** -0.200**
(0.087) (0.092) (0.101)
2 -0.363** -0.358** -0.302*
(0.144) (0.159) (0.173)
3 -0.414** -0.372* -0.304
(0.184) (0.210) (0.227)
4 -0.616** -0.521* -0.498*
(0.246) (0.277) (0.300)
Blood types
O- -0.039 -0.047 -0.035
(0.056) (0.057) (0.059)
A+ 0.006 0.010 0.008
(0.024) (0.024) (0.024)
A- -0.089** -0.078* -0.075*
(0.040) (0.042) (0.043)
ρ (correlation between errors -0.275 -0.321 -0.198
in the structural form) (0.380) (0.377) (0.413)
Wald-tests for joint significance (p-values)
Focal individual:
all blood types 0.49 0.69 0.61
negative blood types 0.66 0.86 0.76
non O-negative blood types 0.49 0.67 0.61
Fellow tenant:
all characteristics 0.02 0.12 0.24
previous donations 0.08 0.05 0.17
all blood types 0.13 0.24 0.31
negative blood types 0.08 0.17 0.21
174 Location FEs? no yes yes
20 Month FEs? no no yes
# of observations 10,120 10,120 10,120
# of dyads 3,723 3,723 3,723
Log likelihood -11,202.87 -10,917.67 -10,883.35
Household cluster robust standard errors in parentheses.
Levels of significance: ∗p < 0.1, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01
Age normalized to sample average.
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4.2 Motivational vs. Informational Spillovers
Having established the existence of strong endogenous social interaction effects, we further investigate what
is the main mechanism that drives them. Previous studies on peer effects in the context of prosocial behavior
have concluded that the observed effects are due to spillovers of information rather than motivation (Lacetera,
Macis and Slonim 2014; Bond et al. 2012; Drago, Mengel and Traxler 2013). In our context both mechanisms
are possible. It is plausible that the baseline estimate presented in table 6 picks up the spillover from the
motivational impulse of the phone call to the other tenant. However it is also possible that the the information
about the scarcity of the blood type, communicated by the phone call, is transmitted within the dyad and
that individuals respond to this information.
Our setup allows us to test for the the presence of an informational channel generating endogenous social
interaction effects, and we provide two tests thereof. Our first test relies on compatibility of blood types
within dyads. Recall that the phone call is made as a function of the scarcity of certain blood types, and this
information is conveyed to the potential donors very clearly. If it is information about the scarcity, rather
than information about one’s motivation that is transmitted between fellow tenants, then this effect should
be stronger if they have compatible blood types.15
We are conducting these tests in the context of the reduced form of the bivariate probit model because
the presence of an informational spillover does not allow us to use the structural form as before to identify the
parameters.16 We augment the reduced form in the bivariate probit model by adding the indicator Cd = 1
if a focal individual’s blood type is compatible to the fellow tenant’s blood type, and Cd = 0 otherwise. We
add the interaction between Cd and the fellow tenant’s phone call, and estimate
Y ∗id = κ0 + κ1Pid + κ2P−id + κ3Cd + κ4Cd × P−id + κ′5Xid + κ′6X−id + uid . (4.1)
If information about the scarcity of the blood type is transmitted between fellow tenants, we would expect
κ2 to vanish, or at least diminish relative to the baseline specification, and κ4 to be significantly positive.
Table 7 displays the results. In the first two columns, it shows the reduced forms of the baseline spec-
ification with and without the indicator Cd. The third column, labeled “Validity Check 1a”, exhibits the
the estimates of equation (4.1). As can be seen, the coefficients and standard errors on one’s own phone
call and the fellow tenant’s phone call remain virtually unchanged. Furthermore, the interaction with the
compatible blood type to the fellow tenant is not statistically significant. Therefore, there is no evidence
that information about the scarcity of the blood type is transmitted, as individuals with incompatible blood
types (which are not scarce at the moment), are no less affected by a phone call to their fellow tenant.
Arguably not all individuals know about the compatibility of different blood types. Columns 4 and 5 show
the same analysis but instead of using compatible blood types, we use identical blood types within dyads
15Compatibility in blood types works as follows. O is the universal donor and can give to everyone. A can give to A and AB.
B can give to B and AB. AB can only give to AB. Regarding the Rh factor, negative blood types can give to positive blood types
but not vice-versa for all blood types.
16Formally, informational spillovers within dyads cause a failure of the exclusion restriction we need to identify δ. For this reason,
the checks can only be conducted in the reduced form.
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(indicated by the binary variable) and its interaction with the fellow tenant’s phone call indicator. The
results are the same. Again, there is little evidence that information about the specific scarcity of the blood
type is transmitted within dyads in a way that affects donation decisions.
A second way of checking for informational spillovers is based on the intuition that the phone calls may
simply serve as a reminder of the blood drive. It is possible that the phone call to one fellow tenant also
reminds the other of the blood drive, despite the invitation letter and the text message that everybody
receives. In this case, a fellow tenant’s phone call should have less of an effect on the other if the other
received a phone call as well. This can be tested by augmenting the reduced form by an interaction between
the two phone calls Pid × P−id. Under this sort of informational spillovers, the coefficient of the interaction
should be significantly negative. Thus, we estimate the equation
Y ∗id = ξ0 + ξ1Pid + ξ2P−id + ξ3Pid × P−id + ξ′4Xid + ξ′5X−id + vid . (4.2)
The results of this validity check are displayed in the sixth column, labeled “Validity check 2” in Table
7. As can be seen, the point estimate of the coefficient of the fellow tenant’s phone call remains positive and
significant. The point estimate of the interaction of the two phone calls is positive – the opposite of what
one would expect if information about the blood drive was transmitted – and insignificant. Hence, we find
no evidence for informational spillovers and therefore interpret the endogenous social interaction effects as
motivational spillovers.
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Table 7: Bivariate probit model, reduced forms
Binary dependent variable: donation decision (0,1)
Bivariate probit Original Augmented Validity Augmented Validity Validity
regression Model Original Model a Check 1a Original Model b Check 1b Check 2
(Eq. 3.8) (Eq. 3.8 aug.) (Eq. 4.1) (Eq. 4.2)
P1d 0.274*** 0.275*** 0.271*** 0.275*** 0.262*** 0.268***
(0.049) (0.049) (0.049) (0.049) (0.049) (0.052)
P2d 0.106** 0.106** 0.100* 0.107** 0.090* 0.100*
(0.051) (0.051) (0.055) (0.051) (0.053) (0.053)
Cd -0.022 -0.025
(0.048) (0.050)
Cd × P2d 0.032
(0.108)
Sd -0.046 -0.053*
(0.031) (0.032)
Sd × P2d 0.136
(0.122)
P1d × P2d 0.036
(0.109)
ρ¯ 0.547*** 0.547*** 0.547*** 0.547*** 0.547*** 0.547***
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
# of observations 10,120 10,120 10,120 10,120 10,120 10,120
# of dyads 3,723 3,723 3,723 3,723 3,723 3,723
Log likelihood -10,883.35 -10,883.19 -10,883.14 -10,881.69 -10881.12 -10,883.30
Wald-test ξ2 + ξ3 = 0 p=0.18
Models additionally include reduced form parameters for X1d and X2d and absorb 174 location and 20 month fixed effects.
Dyad cluster robust standard errors in parentheses. Age normalized to sample average.
The shown variables have the following interpretation: The binary variables P1d and P2d indicate the phone calls to the individual
and the fellow tenant. The binary variable Cd indicates whether the individual’s blood type is compatible to the fellow tenant’s
blood type. The binary variable Sd indicates if the individual and the fellow tenant have the same blood type. ρ¯ is the correlation
between the reduced form error terms.
Levels of significance: ∗p < 0.1, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01
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4.3 The Social Multiplier
Thus, taken together, our evidence suggests motivational spillovers as the source of endogenous social interac-
tion. These spillovers generate a substantial social multiplier for policy interventions. To see how the phone
call affects both individuals in a dyad, consider how the phone call to individual 1 changes her propensity
to donate Y ∗1 : its effect depends both on the phone call, and on the feedback induced by her fellow tenant,
individual 2. Thus, ∆Y ∗1 = γ + δ∆Y
∗
2 . Similarly, the fellow tenant is affected indirectly and her propensity
to donate increases by ∆Y ∗2 = δ∆Y
∗
1 . Solving this system of two equations yields ∆Y
∗
1 = γ/(1 − δ2) and
∆Y ∗2 = γδ/(1− δ2). Thus, the social amplification is 1/(1− δ2) for the individual receiving the call, and a
fraction δ of that for the fellow tenant.
Our baseline estimate of δ = 0.44 implies a substantial social multiplier: the spillovers amplify the
effectiveness of the phone call for the individual called by a factor 1/(1 − 0.442) = 1.24 , and therefore by
0.44/(1− 0.442) = 0.54 for her fellow tenant, individual 2. Overall, this creates a social multiplier, equal to
the sum of the two effects of 1/(1 − 0.44) = 1.79. Even in the strictest specification, our estimate of δ is
0.39, implying a social multiplier of 1/(1− 0.39) = 1.63.
To illustrate the quantitative importance, we calculate the marginal effect of a phone call taking into
account the feedback effects from the baseline specification (detailed in equations (A.7) and (A.8) in appendix
A.3). We find that after individual 1 received a phone call, the increase in the probability to donate is 12
percentage points for individual 1. This contrasts with the estimated effect of the phone call shutting out the
social feedback loop in our model (the impact operating through γ in our model), which raises donations by
roughly 9 percentage points, and dovetails with the findings in Bruhin et al. (2015), where most individuals
do not have a fellow tenant pre-registered for the same blood drive. In addition, the phone call to individual
1, raises the probability to donate by 5 percentage points for individual 2. Thus, motivational spillovers raise
the overall effect of the phone call to 17 percentage points, whereas our model estimates suggest that for an
individual without social ties, a phone call raises the probability to donate by only 9 percentage points.
4.4 Behavioral Heterogeneity
We next turn to examining behavioral heterogeneity. As discussed in section 2.2, our sample contains ap-
proximately 66 percent cohabiting couples and 34 percent neighbors at the same address. The motivational
spillovers are possibly weaker among neighbors than among cohabiting couples. Furthermore, there is evi-
dence of behavioral heterogeneity with respect to prosocial motivations in the literature, thus generating a
further source of heterogeneity. We therefore estimate a finite mixture model that would pick up this sort
of heterogeneity by identifying different types of dyads, even if type-membership is unrelated to observable
characteristics.
However, the estimates of the finite mixture model provide no evidence for the existence of different types
of dyads with distinct behavioral patterns. As shown in table 8, the ICL-BIC reaches its lowest value for a
model with K∗ = 1, i.e., one representative type. In particular, the ambiguity in the classification of dyads
into types, as measured by the entropy in the ICL-BIC, is very large for models with more than one type.
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Hence, these models are overspecified and fit random noise rather than distinct types of dyads.
Figure 4 shows the distribution of the ex-post probabilities of type-membership, τdk, for a finite mixture
model with K = 2 types. It reveals that the classification of dyads into types is indeed highly ambiguous
as the τdk of many dyads lie between 0 and 1. Thus, there is considerable overlap between the two types
the model tries to identify. As illustrated in figure 5, the ambiguity in the dyads’ classification into types
becomes even more pronounced in the finite mixture model with K = 3 types. Therefore, our results indicate
that the baseline specification is a valid and parsimonious representation of the data.
Table 8: ICL-BIC for determining the optimal number of types in a finite mixture model
K∗ = 1 K = 2 K = 3
ICL-BIC 23,731.05 26,448.43 28,132.61
BIC 23,731.05 23,369.67 23,332.60
Entropy 0 3,078.76 4,800.01
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Figure 4: Ex-post probabilities of type-membership: model with K = 2 types
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Figure 5: Ex-post probabilities of type-membership: model with K = 3 types
27
4.5 Robustness Checks
In this subsection, we evaluate the robustness of our results with respect to two ancillary assumptions of
our empirical strategy. The first concerns the choice of the bivariate probit model and the functional form
assumptions that it implies. The second concerns the restriction on the age difference within dyads.
TSLS Estimation of the Social Multiplier
In our baseline results, we use the bivariate probit model as the model of choice, as it follows directly
from the random utility specification we adopt and allows us to model motivational spillovers explicitly.
Furthermore, it also lends itself easily to be augmented for the finite mixture model in our search for
behavioral heterogeneity. On the other hand, the model imposes more structure than is necessary to simply
estimate the social multiplier in behavior. In this subsection, we therefore apply a linear probability model
and use an instrumental variable (IV) strategy to estimate the effect of a fellow tenant’s donation on the
other’s decision to give blood. As long as the conditional mean independence assumption and the exclusion
restrictions are satisfied, this model provides a consistent estimate of the behavioral spillovers (Moffitt
1999). Estimating the linear probability model using an IV strategy allows us to see if the added “non-
linearities” of the bivariate probit model bear any importance to the main conclusion of the paper, namely
the quantitatively large social multiplier implied by our baseline results.
We apply the basic TSLS procedure to estimate the linear probability model. In the first stage, we
predict the fellow tenant’s donation, Yˆ2dt, using the instrumental variable, P2dt, and all exogenous variables
by estimating the following linear model17:
Y2dt = η0 + η1P2dt + η2P1dt + η3X2dt + η4X1dt + 2dt . (4.3)
In the second stage, we regress the other individual’s decision to donate blood, Y1dt, on the fellow tenant’s
predicted donation, Yˆ2dt, and all exogenous variables:
Y1dt = φ0 + φ1P1dt + φ2X1dt + φ3X2dt + φ4Yˆ2dt + 1dt . (4.4)
Table 9 reports the estimated second-stage coefficients for three different specifications. Column (1) shows
the estimated coefficients without any fixed effects, column (2) includes location fixed effects, and column
(3) additionally includes month fixed effects. In sum, the linear probability model yields qualitatively the
same results as the bivariate probit model.
Individuals who receive a phone call are about 8 percentage points more likely to donate blood than
individuals who do not receive such a phone call. As in the bivariate probit model, this effect is highly
statistically significant and robust. The instrument easily passes the the standard tests for strong instruments
(F-statics in the first stage: (1) 39.31, (2) 38.02, (3) 30.27, see Stock, Wright and Yogo (2002)). Thus, in
17Results of the first stage regression are reported in table 13 in the appendix.
28
Table 9: Linear probability model (second stage regressions)
Binary dependent variable: donation decision (0,1)
OLS regression (1) (2) (3)
Phone call (φ1) 0.084*** 0.083*** 0.080***
(0.023) (0.022) (0.021)
Endogenous social interaction (φ4) 0.443*** 0.435*** 0.378**
(0.161) (0.165) (0.179)
Constant (φ0) 0.086*** 0.065** 0.100*
(0.026) (0.032) (0.053)
Focal individual’s characteristics (φ2)
Male 0.034*** 0.030*** 0.031***
(0.008) (0.007) (0.008)
Age 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
# of donations in year before study
1 0.163*** 0.163*** 0.166***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.009)
2 0.296*** 0.303*** 0.305***
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
3 0.366*** 0.385*** 0.389***
(0.025) (0.026) (0.026)
4 0.347*** 0.384*** 0.374***
(0.056) (0.058) (0.068)
Blood Types
O- 0.011 0.010 0.013
(0.021) (0.021) (0.020)
A+ -0.010 -0.009 -0.009
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
A- -0.006 -0.001 -0.001
(0.016) (0.015) (0.015)
Fellow tenant’s characteristics (φ3)
Male -0.003 -0.007 -0.005
(0.010) (0.009) (0.010)
Age -0.002** -0.002** -0.002*
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
# of donations in year before study
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1 -0.079*** -0.077*** -0.065**
(0.028) (0.028) (0.031)
2 -0.132*** -0.122** -0.103*
(0.049) (0.052) (0.057)
3 -0.156** -0.134* -0.109
(0.065) (0.071) (0.077)
4 -0.215*** -0.176* -0.163
(0.082) (0.092) (0.100)
Blood types
O- -0.013 -0.015 -0.010
(0.019) (0.019) (0.020)
A+ 0.004 0.005 0.004
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
A- -0.028** -0.022* -0.021
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
F-statistics of instrument (1. Stage) 39.31 38.02 30.27
F-tests for joint significance (p-values)
Focal individual:
all blood types 0.44 0.61 0.54
negative blood types 0.66 0.86 0.77
non O-negative blood types 0.40 0.49 0.48
Fellow tenant:
all characteristics 0.01 0.09 0.22
previous donations 0.04 0.04 0.14
all blood types 0.12 0.25 0.32
negative blood types 0.10 0.23 0.27
174 Location FEs? no yes yes
20 Month FEs? no no yes
# of observations 20,240 20,240 20,240
# of dyads 3,723 3,723 3,723
R-squared 0.201 0.212 0.220
Household cluster robust standard errors in parentheses.
Levels of significance: ∗p < 0.1, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01
Age normalized to sample average.
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terms of the effectiveness of the phone call, the TSLS estimates are virtually identical to the marginal effects
obtained from our baseline specification.
We observe strong and significant endogenous social interaction which is robust to fixed effects. An
individual’s probability to donate blood increases by about 40 percentage points if her fellow tenant donates.
In this model, again, the social multiplier is given by 1/(1 − φ4). With a value of about 1.67, it lies in the
same range as in the bivariate probit model.
The estimated influence of individual characteristics on donation rates is robust and comparable to the
bivariate probit model too. Given a positive baseline donation rate of 32 percent, men are about 3 percentage
points more likely to donate blood than women. This effect is statistically highly significant and robust.
Donation rates increase with age. On average, an individual that is 10 years older donates 4 percentage points
more often than the younger individual. Hence, in terms of magnitude, the influence of gender corresponds
to an 8-year age effect. Furthermore, a regular donor is more likely to donate than an irregular or an inactive
donor. Similar to the bivariate probit model, the effects of previous donations are much stronger than gender
and age effects. This indicates that past unobservables strongly influence donor motivation. Blood types do
not affect the individuals’ motivation (F-test for joint significance (1) p-value: 0.44, (2) p-value: 0.61, (3)
p-value: 0.54). Individuals with highly demanded, negative blood types do not exhibit higher donation rates
(F-test for joint significance (1) p-value: 0.86, (2) p-value: 0.86, (3) p-value: 0.77). Similarly, the evidence
of exogenous social interactions is weak in this specification as well.
The Role of the Age-Difference Restriction
A perhaps somewhat arbitrary restriction in creating our sample is that we only consider dyads of fellow
tenants with an age difference of less than 20 years. We motivated this restriction with previous evidence
showing that individuals with strong social ties are most often close in age. However, it is nevertheless
instructive to examine its role in our estimations. We reestimate the baseline specifications of the bivariate
probit model in two alternative samples: one with an even stricter restriction on the intra-dyad age difference
of less than 10 years, and one with no such age restriction at all.
Table 10 displays the results. We present the results in a more compact form, focusing only on the esti-
mates of endogenous social interaction δ, the impact of the phone call γ, and the estimate of the correlations
in unobservables ρ to assess the sensitivity of our baseline estimates with regard to the different age cutoffs.
Panel A of table 10 shows the estimates for the first sample with the 10-year restriction on the intra-dyad
age difference. This eliminates 509 dyads from our sample, shrinking the number of observations to 8, 811.
The best available evidence (Kalmijn and Vermunt 2007) suggest that roughly 15 percent of one’s close
social ties have an age difference of more than 10 years. Since our restriction eliminates roughly the same
number of dyads, this should not lead to a notable change in the likelihood of social ties within our sample.
Consistent with this interpretation, the point estimates of δ are almost exactly the same as in our baseline
specification, or perhaps slightly higher. This is also true for the other parameters of the model, as can be
seen by the similarity of of the estimates for γ and ρ.
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Table 10: Bivariate probit model without age restriction
Panel A: Age difference restricted to less than 10 years
Bivariate probit regression (1) (2) (3)
Phone call (γ) 0.216*** 0.220*** 0.214***
(0.071) (0.073) (0.069)
Endogenous social interaction (δ) 0.475** 0.477** 0.419**
(0.187) (0.192) (0.210)
ρ (correlation between errors -0.303 -0.346 -0.219
in the structural form) ( 0.440) (0.438) (0.485)
174 Location FEs? no yes yes
20 Month FEs? no no yes
# of dyads 3,214 3,214 3,214
# of observations 8,811 8,811 8,811
Log likelihood -9,709.93 -9,461.13 -9,432.97
Panel B: No restriction on age difference
Bivariate probit regression (1) (2) (3)
Phone call (γ) 0.254*** 0.257*** 0.243***
(0.050) (0.051) (0.047)
Endogenous social interaction (δ) 0.325** 0.318** 0.243
(0.150) (0.156) (0.172)
ρ (correlation between errors -0.083 -0.107 0.050
in the structural form) (0.333) (0.343) (0.364)
174 Location FEs? no yes yes
20 Month FEs? no no yes
# of dyads 5,053 5,053 5,053
# of observations 13,421 13,421 13,421
Log likelihood -15,021.41 -14,667.31 -14,625.88
Models additionally include coefficients for X1d and X2d and a constant.
Household cluster robust standard errors in parentheses.
Levels of significance: ∗p < 0.1, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01
Age normalized to sample average.
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When we consider panel B of table 10, showing the estimates for the second sample with no age restriction,
the number of dyads increases from 3, 723 to 5, 053, or by 35 percent. By contrast, evidence suggests that
only roughly 10 percent of all social ties involve age differences of more than 20 years. Thus, relaxing the
age restriction should add a disproportionate share of observations without social ties, which could decrease
our estimates of δ. Panel B of table 10 displays the results. Indeed, there is somewhat of a decrease in the
estimate of the spillover effects, though they remain within one standard error of our baseline estimates for
each of the specifications, and are still significant for two of the three models. As before, there is virtually
no change in the point estimate or precision of, i.e., the effectiveness of the phone call. Thus, there is no
evidence that the additional observations generally are less predictable.
Overall, our conclusions are not sensitive to the age restriction. The point estimates do vary in the
direction predicted by the evidence on social ties and age differences, with the point estimates being somewhat
larger when the age restriction is tighter than when it is loosened; in particular when it adds a lot of
observations known to be unlikely candidates for social ties.
Within our framework, we could also examine the sensitivity of our results by explicitly making δ de-
pendent on the age difference. Intuitively, this would add the interaction between the fellow tenant’s phone
call and the intra-dyad age difference as an additional variable to the structural form equations 3.6 and
3.7. However, while our instrument is strong for the baseline specification, the instruments also using the
interaction with the age difference fails the Kleinbergen-Paap criterion (Kleibergen and Paap 2006), possibly
due to the collinearity between the two instruments. Due to this inherent source of ambiguity, we refrain
from further exploring that issue.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we use a large panel data set with quasi-randomized phone calls to analyze the effects of social
interaction on voluntary blood donations between fellow tenants. We find strong evidence for endogenous
social interaction, which we interpret as motivational spillovers, but no significant evidence for exogenous
social interaction.
Overall, motivational spillovers have a forceful impact on donor motivation, as they generate a social
multiplier that amplifies the direct impact of policy interventions by 63 to 79 percent. It remains an open
question as to what the precise psychological mechanism is behind the behavioral evidence of motivational
spillovers. It may simply be more enjoyable to undertake an activity together, irrespective of whether it is a
prosocial activity or not: going to an event in the company of a person with whom one has social ties may
provide for better conversations on the way and while waiting, or quite simply lower the (perceived) time
costs of taking this activity in other ways. Alternatively, there may be image motivation involved specific
to the prosocial activity, as one’s fellow tenant witnesses one’s prosocial act, in the spirit of Be´nabou and
Tirole (2006). It is also possible that our results pick up the interplay between pro-social individuals and
conformists, who are more likely to donate if others do so as well, as suggested in Sliwka (2007). Perhaps
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somewhat surprisingly, there is no evidence for the existence of different types of dyads that qualitatively
differ in the extent or type of social interaction, making it – in our eyes – more likely that spillovers
in motivation are due to joint consumption or lower costs of joint donation. However, all of the above
interpretations are consistent with our results. Importantly, also the more “mundane” interpretations such
as simply making donating more enjoyable (or less costly) in company, produce the same type of policy
multiplier, as our model in the appendix illustrates.
Thus, irrespective of its source, the main finding of motivational spillovers has several policy implications.
First, these motivational spillovers between fellow tenants are strong, and could therefore offset diminish-
ing returns of policy interventions via social multipliers. Thus, applying policy interventions to groups of
individuals in which motivational spillovers are likely present and strong – such as couples, flat mates, fam-
ilies, members of sports clubs or churches, for example – is more cost-effective than targeting independent
individuals. Second, facilitating motivational spillovers and especially encouraging donors to announce their
support of blood donation within their social network could increase donation rates significantly. For exam-
ple, blood donation services could use virtual social networks that allow blood donors to communicate their
donations to individuals with whom they have social ties, without the need of physical proximity. Third, our
results reinforce the notion that social forces may be highly effective levers to promote prosocial behavior.
Lacetera, Macis and Slonim (2014) show that information about incentives spreads rapidly through donor
networks. Our results show that motivation also spills over among donors, at least when social ties likely
exist between them. Overall, this suggests that interventions putting social forces to work hold the promise
of delivering effective policy interventions.
The policy implications of motivational spillovers are not confined to voluntary blood donations but
also apply to other fields in which endogenous social interaction plays an important role. There are many
other potential settings in which similar mechanisms may be operating, such as volunteering, or other civic
engagements like turning out to vote. Bond et al. (2012) find spillovers on political participation through
an online community that are so strong that the indirect effects in the network are even larger than the
direct effect of the intervention. Mechanisms that exploit social networks among, and social ties between
individuals, are possible routes that could amplify traditional policy interventions aiming at increasing
contributions to such public goods.
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A Appendix
A.1 A Game-Theoretic Model Generating Motivational Spillovers
We consider a game between two players, denoted player 1 and player 2. Each has a benefit B from donating
blood. The utility of not donating is normalized to zero. Importantly, there is a consumption externality
in the activity: If both players engage in the activity, the benefits are increased by b ≥ 0 for each of them.
Each player also has a cost ci of engaging in the prosocial activity. These costs are drawn from a uniform
distribution, [0, C]. We consider two versions of the game. In the first version, each player’s draw is known
to him only, though the distribution is common knowledge. In this case, the game is a game of incomplete
information, and has a unique mixed-strategy equilibrium that has straightforward interpretation in terms of
our structural model. In particular, the strategy for identifying the social spillover parameter, that arises here
from the strategic interaction, rather than actual utility spillovers, is exactly the same as in our econometric
model. However, one may argue that players can communicate after they observe their private costs. We also
address this second version of the game. In this case, the game has a pure-strategy equilibrium. However,
as we show below, averaging over individuals, this version of the game inherits all the properties of the first
version of the game and also implies that the identification of the spillover parameter can be done as in our
empirical model.
Version 1: incomplete information about ci. In order to model the effect of the phone call, assume
that only player 2 receives a phone call and that it raises his utility from donating by γ (e.g., by making the
benefits of donating more salient). For the sake of this application, we assume that player 1 knows about
the phone call (or the extra utility γ to the other player). This lets us examine how, in equilibrium, the
additional motivation γ spills over to player 1.
The game is a simultaneous-move game: each player has to decide whether or not to donate without
knowing the other player’s strategy. We are looking for the (unique) Nash equilibrium in this game. Player
1 will attend the blood drive if
B + p2b− c1 ≥ 0 (A.1)
where p2 is the probability that player 2 will also go to the blood drive. Similarly, player 2 will attend the
blood drive if
B + γ + p1b− c2 ≥ 0 (A.2)
Thus, p2 is given by
p2 = Pr(c2 ≤ B + γ + p1b) = Fc(B + γ + p1b)
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and p1 is given by
p1 = Pr(c1 ≤ B + p2b) = Fc(B + p2b)
Where Fc() is the c.d.f. of the random costs ci. Imposing the assumption of the uniform distribution yields
a system of linear equations in p1 and p2:
p2 =
B + γ + p1b
C
and p1 is given by
p1 =
B + p2b
C
Solving for p1 and p2, one obtains
p1 =
B
C − b + γ
b
C2 − b2
and
p2 =
B
C − b + γ
C
C2 − b2
It is instructive to define δ ≡ bC , which, in this setting, has the interpretation of being the probability that
the utility cost of donating blood is less than or equal to the benefit from donating together. Substituting
this term in the optimal donation probabilities, we obtain
p1 =
B
C
1
1− δ +
γ
C
δ
1− δ2
and
p2 =
B
C
1
1− δ +
γ
C
1
1− δ2
Thus, the simple game we formulate provides the primitives for the econometric model that we estimate.
It displays a social multiplier in the“reduced form”of donation probabilities exactly the way it is found in
the econometric model. The ratio of coefficients on γ identify the spillover parameter δ in exactly the same
way as in the econometric model: In general, any factor increasing utility of player 2 by one unit, spills over
to player 1 by a proportion δ. It produces the same social multipliers that are relevant for policy as our
econometric model.
Thus, the model outlined above provides a structural foundation of the model we estimate. Notice also,
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that in this setup, the parameter δ has a somewhat different interpretation: it is not directly a utility
spillover, but rather a parameter produced by the optimal behavior given the other player’s motivation that
is related to the utility from joint donation b. Therefore, there are many possible psychological mechanisms
that can lead to this type of spillover: in our model, b could be interpreted as image motivation, as suggested
by Be´nabou and Tirole (2011): being seen by a friend donating blood may increase one’s utility because it
increases one’s image as a ”good” person. It could also reflect the mere effect of enjoying to meet a friend
at an occasion, or simply reflect a reduced cost of donating, e.g. because meeting a friend would lower
transportation costs back from the blood drive.
Version 2: complete information about ci. In this version of the game, player 1 will donate if
c1 < B, and if he is certain that player 2 will also donate, he will donate also if B < c1 < B + b. Similarly,
player 2 will donate if c1 < B + γ, and if she is certain that player 1 will also donate, she will donate also if
B + γ < c1 < B + b+ γ. Overall, this implies that
Pr(Player 1 donates) = Pr(c1 < B) + Pr(B < c1 < B + b) · Pr(c2 < B + b+ γ) (A.3)
=
B
C
+
b
C
B + b+ γ
C
=
B
C
+ δ
B + b
C
+ δ
γ
C
where the second line of the equation exploits the properties of the uniform distribution. Similarly, for player
2, we have
Pr(Player 2 donates) = Pr(c2 < B + γ) + Pr(B + γ < c1 < B + b+ γ) · Pr(c1 < B + b) (A.4)
=
B + γ
C
+
b
C
B + b
C
=
B
C
+ δ
B + b
C
+
γ
C
As can be seen from equations (A.3) and (A.4), the ratio of the impacts of γ on player 2 compared to player
1 identify again the spillover effect δ ≡ b/C, as in the case with incomplete information. Thus, also in
a simultaneous-move game with complete information, the same behavioral pattern that leads to a policy
multiplier emerges. This widens the possible interpretations that can be given to b: for instance, it could
also be a reduction in the transportation cost to go to the blood drive.
A.2 Recovering Parameters from the Reduced Form
Express equation 3.8 as
Y1d = α0 + α1P1d + α2P2d + α3X1d + α4X2d + v1 (A.5)
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Taking the ratio of the coefficients of P2d and P1d yields
δ = α2/α1,
γ = α1(1− δ2) = α1 − α22/α1.
Once δ is identified, the other parameters can be derived too:
β0 = α0(1− δ2)/(1 + δ) = α0(1− (α2/α1)2)/(1 + (α2/α1))
β1 = α3 − δα4 = α3 − (α2/α1)α4
β2 = α4 − δα3 = α4 − (α2/α1)α3
The standard errors of the structural form parameters are obtained via the delta-method:
∇(δ) =
(−α2/α21
1/α1
)
∇(γ) =
(
1 + α22/α
2
1
−2α2/α1
)
∇(β0) =

1−α22
α1
2
1+
α2
α1
2α0α2
2
α13
(
1+
α2
α1
) + α0α2
(
1−α22
α1
2
)
α12
(
1+
α2
α1
)2
− 2α0α2
α12
(
1+
α2
α1
) − α0
(
1−α22
α1
2
)
α1
(
1+
α2
α1
)2

∇(β1) =

α2α4/α
2
1
−α4/α1
1
−α2/α1

∇(β2) =

α2α3/α
2
1
−α3/α1
−α2/α1
1

se(δ) = [∇(δ)′ × Cov(α1, α2)×∇(δ)]1/2
se(γ) = [∇(γ)′ × Cov(α1, α2)×∇(γ)]1/2
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se(β0) = [∇(β0)′ × Cov(α0, α1, α2)×∇(β0)]1/2
se(β1) = [∇(β1)′ × Cov(α1, α2, α3, α4)×∇(β1)]1/2
se(β2) = [∇(β2)′ × Cov(α1, α2, α3, α4)×∇(β2)]1/2
A.3 Marginal Effects in the Bivariate Probit Model
Define Zd = (Pd, Y
∗
d , Xd), ζ = (γ, δ, β
′)′. The discrete probability effect of the phone reminder holding the
social interaction effects constant is given by
∆Pcall ≡ Φ
(
γ1 + ζ
′Zd
)− Φ (ζ ′Zd) . (A.6)
The change in the probability of donation of the individual receiving the phone call, and taking into account
the feedback loops with the fellow tenant’s motivation is given by
∆P1 ≡ Φ
(
γ1
1− δ2 + ζ
′Zd
)
− Φ(ζ ′Zd) , (A.7)
where 1/(1− δ2) is the social multiplier discussed in section 4. Similarly, the effect on the fellow tenant not
receiving a phone call is given by
∆P2 ≡ Φ
(
γ1δ
1− δ2 + ζ
′Zd
)
− Φ(ζ ′Zd) , (A.8)
where δ/(1− δ2) is the spillover onto the fellow tenant who has not received the phone call.
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B Online Appendix
Table 11: Bivariate probit model with ρ = 0
Binary dependent variable: donation decision (0,1)
Bivariate probit regression (1) (2) (3)
Phone call (γ) 0.228*** 0.236*** 0.227***
(0.066) (0.067) (0.063)
Endogenous social interaction (δ) 0.466*** 0.456*** 0.406**
(0.167) (0.170) (0.185)
Constant (β0) -0.535*** -0.635*** -0.624***
(0.170) (0.218) (0.239)
Focal individual’s characteristics (β1)
Male 0.107*** 0.097*** 0.100***
(0.024) (0.024) (0.025)
Age 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.013***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
# of donations in year before study
1 0.513*** 0.533*** 0.541***
(0.031) (0.032) (0.032)
2 0.859*** 0.913*** 0.922***
(0.038) (0.040) (0.040)
3 1.034*** 1.123*** 1.137***
(0.067) (0.073) (0.073)
4 1.004*** 1.135*** 1.119***
(0.130) (0.135) (0.161)
Blood types
O- 0.035 0.032 0.042
(0.060) (0.061) (0.060)
A+ -0.031 -0.026 -0.026
(0.023) (0.024) 0.024)
A- -0.012 0.008 0.008
(0.049) (0.048) (0.047)
Fellow tenant’s characteristics (β2)
Male -0.009 -0.019 -0.012
(0.031) (0.030) (0.032)
Age -0.007** -0.007** -0.006*
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(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
# donations in year before study
1 -0.255*** -0.257*** -0.223**
(0.090) (0.095) (0.105)
2 -0.402*** -0.387** -0.336*
(0.148) (0.162) (0.178)
3 -0.463** -0.412* -0.349
(0.190) (0.214) (0.223)
4 -0.633*** -0.527* -0.510*
(0.241) (0.274) (0.298)
Blood Types
O- -0.042 -0.046 -0.036
(0.057) (0.058) (0.060)
A+ 0.010 0.013 0.011
(0.024) (0.024) (0.025)
A- -0.087** -0.078* -0.076*
(0.040) (0.043) (0.043)
ρ (correlation between errors 0 0 0
in the structural form)
Wald-tests for joint significance (p-values)
Focal individual
all blood types 0.44 0.65 0.57
negative blood types 0.68 0.87 0.77
non O-negative blood types 0.42 0.52 0.51
Fellow tenant:
all characteristics 0.01 0.08 0.20
previous donations 0.05 0.04 0.14
all blood types 0.12 0.23 0.29
negative blood types 0.09 0.18 0.21
174 Location FEs? no yes yes
20 Month FEs? no no yes
# of observations 10,120 10,120 10,120
# of dyads 3,723 3,723 3,723
Log likelihood -11,848.19 -11,466.89 -11,421.09
Household cluster robust standard errors in parentheses.
Levels of significance: ∗p < 0.1, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01
Age normalized to sample average.
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B.1 Finite mixture regression results
Table 12: Finite mixture model with K = 2 types
Binary dependent variable: donation decision (0,1)
Bivariate probit regression Type 1 Type 2
Individual Individual
Phone call (γk) 0.052 0.209**
(0.336) (0.100)
Endogenous social interaction (δk) 0.937** -0.181
(0.412) (0.446)
Constant (β0k) -0.147 -0.808*
(0.957) (0.446)
Focal individual’s characteristics (β1k)
Male 0.022 0.082
(0.164) (0.068)
Age 0.058*** 0.005
(0.021) (0.008)
# of donations in year before study
1 1.829*** 0.478***
(0.414) (0.091)
2 2.610*** 0.738***
(0.432) (0.149)
3 3.429*** 0.888***
(0.788) (0.196)
4 3.041*** 0.435
(0.574) (0.426)
Blood Types
O- -0.110 0.096
(0.239) (0.099)
A+ -0.021 0.009
(0.124) (0.090)
A- 0.052 0.048
(0.221) (0.077)
Fellow tenant’s characteristics (β2k)
Male 0.013 -0.016
(0.230) (0.044)
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Age -0.057** 0.007***
(0.028) (0.002)
# of donations in year before study
1 -1.769* 0.274**
(1.035) (0.126)
2 -2.507*** 0.436
(0.941) (0.304)
3 -3.322* 0.645**
(1.893) (0.268)
4 -2.868** -0.113
(1.357) (0.238)
Blood Types
O- 0.100 -0.003
(0.217) (0.061)
A+ 0.011 0.043
(0.064) (0.064)
A- -0.077 -0.019
(0.228) (0.037)
ρk (correlation between errors -0.988*** 0.670
in the structural form) (0.170) (0.509)
pik (share among the population) 0.456 0.544
(0.060) (0.060)
174 Location FEs? yes
20 Month FEs? yes
# of observations 10,120
# of dyads 3,723
Log likelihood -10,596.61
Household cluster robust standard errors in parentheses.
Levels of significance: ∗p < 0.1, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01
Age normalized to sample average.
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B.2 First stages of 2SLS
Table 13: Linear probability model (first stage regressions)
Binary dependent variable: fellow tenant’s donation decision (0,1)
OLS regression (1) (2) (3)
Constant (η0) 0.154*** 0.114** 0.161**
(0.015) (0.047) (0.073)
Fellow tenant’s phone 0.104*** 0.102*** 0.093***
call (η1) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017)
Focal individual’s phone 0.046*** 0.045*** 0.035**
call (η2) (0.016) (0.017) (0.017)
Fellow tenant’s characteristics (η3)
Male 0.041*** 0.033*** 0.034***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Age 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
# of donations in year before study
1 0.159*** 0.160*** 0.165***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
2 0.295*** 0.308*** 0.311***
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
3 0.370*** 0.403*** 0.406***
(0.024) (0.025) (0.025)
4 0.313*** 0.379*** 0.365***
(0.099) (0.105) (0.110)
Blood Types
O- 0.007 0.004 0.010
(0.020) (0.020) (0.020)
A+ -0.011 -0.008 -0.009
(0.009) (0.008) (0.008)
A- -0.023 -0.013 -0.010
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
Focal individual’s characteristics (η4)
Male 0.015 0.007 0.008
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Age -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
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# of donations in year before study
1 -0.009 -0.008 -0.003
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
2 -0.001 0.012 0.015
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
3 0.008 0.041* 0.044*
(0.024) (0.024) (0.024)
4 -0.077 -0.011 -0.025
(0.105) (0.110) (0.114)
Blood Types
O- -0.010 -0.013 -0.006
(0.018) (0.019) (0.019)
A+ -0.001 0.002 0.001
(0.009) (0.008) (0.008)
A- -0.038** -0.028* -0.025*
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
F-tests of instrument 39.31 38.02 30.27
174 Location FEs? no yes yes
20 Month FEs? no no yes
# of observations 20,240 20,240 20,240
# of dyads 3,723 3,723 3,723
R-squared 0.084 0.118 0.122
Household cluster robust standard errors in parentheses.
Levels of significance: ∗p < 0.1, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01
Age normalized to sample average.
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